{"id":50343,"date":"2026-11-18T21:19:52","date_gmt":"2026-11-18T15:49:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.getastra.com\/blog\/?p=50343"},"modified":"2026-11-18T21:29:40","modified_gmt":"2026-11-18T15:59:40","slug":"nginx2root","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.getastra.com\/blog\/security-advisory\/nginx2root\/","title":{"rendered":"nginx2root: Five nginx RCE Flaws and a Kernel Bug (CVE-2026-123007)"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"TLDR\"><\/span>TLDR;<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>nginx2root is a set of five nginx remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities, led by CVE-2026-123007 in HTTP\/2 handling, plus a Linux kernel SCTP flaw that can lift a worker foothold to host root.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The researchers rate the set Critical, but CVSS scores aren\u2019t published yet.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>CVE-2026-123007 <\/strong>affects every official nginx release from 1.9.5 through 1.31.8 when HTTP\/2 is enabled.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>nginx 1.31.9<\/strong> is the fixed release, scheduled for November 19, 2026.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Until it ships, disable HTTP\/2 and the other affected features listed under Workaround.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>nginx2root was discovered and reported by Xint researchers @imssm99, @cdor1, @tjbecker, and @yves.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">nginx2root is the name given to five independent nginx vulnerabilities and one Linux kernel flaw, published on November 18, 2026. nginx is a widely deployed web server and reverse proxy. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Each of the five nginx flaws lets an unauthenticated remote attacker run commands with the privileges of an nginx worker process, in different configurations: <strong>CVE-2026-123007, CVE-2026-123634, CVE-2026-123633, CVE-2026-121810<\/strong>, and <strong>CVE-2026-113425. CVE-2026-123007 <\/strong>reaches the most servers because it only needs HTTP\/2 enabled. The researchers chained it with a separate Linux kernel SCTP flaw to gain root on the host, including from inside a Docker container.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Technical_Details_of_CVE-2026-123007\"><\/span>Technical Details of CVE-2026-123007<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">CVE-2026-123007 is an integer overflow in HTTP\/2 flow control. nginx subtracts queued response data from the connection send window and returns that credit when a stream is cancelled before the data is sent. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A client can raise the window with WINDOW_UPDATE frames while data waits in the queue, then cancel the streams, so cleanup adds the credit a second time without checking the protocol maximum. The window then exceeds its limit, the capacity check underflows, and later updates keep growing it. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A signed and unsigned conversion finally produces an enormous copy length, which corrupts heap metadata and discloses addresses. The researchers used this to run commands as the worker over a public port on AWS, GCP, and Azure. No authentication or user interaction is required.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The other four are use-after-free bugs. CVE-2026-123634 sits in the DNS resolver and needs request-time resolution plus the mirror directive. CVE-2026-123633 (HTTP\/2) and CVE-2026-121810 (HTTP\/3) arise when connection draining frees a request that is still running. CVE-2026-113425 affects the mail proxy during auth_http logins. The kernel flaw is a use-after-free or double free in the SCTP send path, present since Linux 4.15. The sources list no CVE ID or kernel patch for it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Affected_Products_or_Versions_by_nginx2root\"><\/span>Affected Products or Versions by nginx2root <span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">CVE-2026-123007 spans every official release from 1.9.5 through 1.31.8, and the master branch carried the vulnerable code on November 10, 2026. Distributions may backport fixes without changing the nginx version string, so compare the full package version with the distribution advisory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>CVE-2026-123007:<\/strong> HTTP\/2 enabled, from 1.9.5.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>CVE-2026-123634:<\/strong> resolver, request-derived proxy_pass, and mirror with mirror_request_body off, from 1.13.4.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>CVE-2026-123633<\/strong>: HTTP\/2 with upstream forwarding, from 1.19.7.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>CVE-2026-121810:<\/strong> HTTP\/3 with upstream forwarding, from 1.25.0.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>CVE-2026-113425:<\/strong> mail proxy using proxy on and auth_http, from 0.5.15.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Fixed version:<\/strong> 1.31.9.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Not affected by CVE-2026-123007: <\/strong>1.9.4 and earlier, or builds without the HTTP\/2 module.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Kernel SCTP flaw:<\/strong> Linux 4.15 onward, unpatched at publication.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Impact if exploited<\/strong>: Commands run as the nginx worker. Root on the host needs the kernel SCTP flaw, which was unpatched at publication. Containers share the host kernel, so a successful kernel exploit reaches every container on that host.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Are_We_Exploitable_by_nginx2root\"><\/span>Are We Exploitable by nginx2root?<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The answer depends on your configuration. The ratings below are our own reading of the published research and will change as more information arrives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><thead><tr><th>CVE<\/th><th>Condition for exposure<\/th><th>Realistic chance<\/th><th>Technical basis<\/th><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td>CVE-2026-123007<\/td><td>Unpatched 1.9.5 to 1.31.8, HTTP\/2 module built in, HTTP\/2 reachable<\/td><td><strong>High<\/strong> when all three hold<\/td><td>Needs only a TLS port that negotiates <code>h2<\/code>. Success was shown from a public IP on AWS, GCP, and Azure, under concurrent normal traffic.<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>CVE-2026-123633<\/td><td>HTTP\/2 with <code>proxy_pass<\/code><\/td><td><strong>Moderate<\/strong><\/td><td>The attacker must fill the worker\u2019s connection slots (draining starts at 1\/16 free or fewer), and nginx must be able to open a TCP connection to the attacker.<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>CVE-2026-121810<\/td><td>HTTP\/3 (QUIC) listener with upstream forwarding<\/td><td><strong>Low to moderate<\/strong><\/td><td>Needs UDP 443 exposed, the same slot pressure, and outbound TCP to the attacker.<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>CVE-2026-123634<\/td><td><code>resolver<\/code>, variable <code>proxy_pass<\/code>, and <code>mirror<\/code><\/td><td><strong>Low<\/strong><\/td><td>An uncommon configuration. The nginx resolver must also reach an attacker-controlled DNS server.<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>CVE-2026-113425<\/td><td>Mail proxy with <code>auth_http<\/code><\/td><td><strong>Low<\/strong><\/td><td>Applies only to mail proxy deployments. No credentials are needed.<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Kernel SCTP flaw<\/td><td>Worker code execution plus reachable SCTP<\/td><td><strong>Moderate<\/strong> after a successful nginx exploit<\/td><td>Many distributions autoload the SCTP module. Reachability depends on the kernel, modules, and container restrictions.<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Why does CVE-2026-123007 carry the highest chance<\/strong>?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The attack uses standard HTTP\/2 frames (SETTINGS, PING, WINDOW_UPDATE, RST_STREAM) over a long-lived TLS connection. It needs no credentials and no special directive. Among hosts that report a version, 98.9% of 11.94 million Shodan results fall inside the affected range. That figure counts version strings only, so backported fixes and disabled HTTP\/2 will lower the real number.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>What slows attackers down<\/strong>?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The writeup withholds the final exploitation steps. The demonstrated chain relies on glibc\u2019s x86-64 <code>memcpy<\/code> behavior (a backward-copy loop present since glibc 2.24) and on heap grooming through Range and Cookie headers. The sources do not cover reliability on other architectures or C libraries. The walkthrough is detailed, so we expect skilled attackers to reproduce it over time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If your version is in range (or a backport is unverified), the HTTP\/2 module is present, and <code>ALPN protocol: h2<\/code> appears on the real nginx port, treat the server as exploitable and apply the Workaround now.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Detection_for_nginx2root\"><\/span>Detection for nginx2root<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Exposure for CVE-2026-123007 depends on version, module, and configuration. Attack traces are sparse because the HTTP\/2 control frames are encrypted and absent from access logs, so combine several signals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Run <code>nginx -v<\/code> and <code>nginx -V<\/code> to check the version and the <code>--with-http_v2_module<\/code> flag.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Run <code>sudo nginx -T<\/code> and search for <code>http2<\/code> in <code>listen<\/code> directives or <code>http2 on;<\/code>.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>From outside, run <code>openssl s_client -alpn h2<\/code>. <code>ALPN protocol: h2<\/code> means HTTP\/2 is reachable.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Compare <code>ss -tinp<\/code> counters over time. Long-lived connections with fast-growing <code>bytes_received<\/code> and little <code>bytes_sent<\/code> match the tested attack.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Add an <code>auditd<\/code> rule for <code>execve<\/code> by the worker UID. A shell started by a worker is the clearest sign of compromise.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Check <code>error.log<\/code> and <code>coredumpctl list nginx<\/code> for worker crashes.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The research publishes no IOCs such as IP addresses or file hashes.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Mitigation_for_nginx2root\"><\/span>Mitigation for nginx2root<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Update to nginx 1.31.9 once it is released (scheduled for November 19, 2026) and confirm the build includes fixes for all five CVEs. For distribution packages, compare the full package version with the distribution\u2019s security advisory. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The research points to the nginx vendor advisory K000164058 for patch details. After installing, restart nginx or complete a live binary upgrade, because a configuration reload does not replace the running executable. Apply the Linux kernel fix for the SCTP flaw when one is available.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Workaround_for_nginx2root\"><\/span>Workaround for nginx2root <span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The research lists temporary measures for each path. They remain temporary until the patch is installed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>CVE-2026-123007 and CVE-2026-123633: <\/strong>disable HTTP\/2 on affected ports (<code>http2 off;<\/code> on 1.25.1 and later, remove <code>http2<\/code> from <code>listen<\/code> on older releases). Native gRPC services will be affected.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>CVE-2026-123634:<\/strong> point <code>proxy_pass<\/code> at a fixed upstream group and turn off <code>mirror<\/code> if unused. Other subrequest features such as SSI may reach the same bug.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>CVE-2026-121810:<\/strong> remove <code>quic<\/code> listeners, set <code>http3 off;<\/code>, and send <code>Alt-Svc 'clear'<\/code>.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>CVE-2026-113425:<\/strong> bind mail listeners to a loopback address or allow only trusted IPs through the firewall.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Kernel SCTP flaw:<\/strong> on hosts that do not use SCTP, add <code>install sctp \/bin\/false<\/code> under <code>\/etc\/modprobe.d\/<\/code>. This leaves an already loaded module and built-in SCTP in place.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"How_Astra_Helps\"><\/span>How Astra Helps <span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1507\" height=\"1600\" src=\"\/cdn-cgi\/image\/quality=80,format=auto,onerror=redirect,metadata=none\/https:\/\/cdn-blog.getastra.com\/2026\/01\/69030f77-image.png\" alt=\"Astra Security's automated DAST tool + nginx2root\" class=\"wp-image-45051\" srcset=\"\/cdn-cgi\/image\/quality=80,format=auto,onerror=redirect,metadata=none\/https:\/\/cdn-blog.getastra.com\/2026\/01\/69030f77-image.png 1507w, \/cdn-cgi\/image\/width=1447,height=1536,fit=crop,quality=80,format=auto,onerror=redirect,metadata=none\/https:\/\/cdn-blog.getastra.com\/2026\/01\/69030f77-image.png 1447w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1507px) 100vw, 1507px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">When a flaw like nginx2root drops, the first question is simple: where is nginx running in our environment? Astra helps you answer it fast.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">We are watching the nginx advisories, distribution advisories, and CISA KEV, and we will add scanner coverage and detections across Astra DAST, API Security Testing, and the Cloud Scanner as soon as there is enough confirmed information. This page will be updated when that happens.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">You can start preparing today if you run Continuous Pentest or <a href=\"https:\/\/www.getastra.com\/blog\/penetration-testing\/autonomous\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Autonomous Pentesting<\/a>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Find your nginx hosts:<\/strong> API discovery lists every HTTP-reachable endpoint and the stack behind it, so one query shows which hosts run nginx.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Verify your fixes:<\/strong> Our pentest team can run a scoped retest on your nginx attack surface once the patch is out.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Think nginx2root might affect you? <a href=\"https:\/\/www.getastra.com\/contact-us\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Talk to our team<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Disclaimer:<\/strong> This advisory reflects information available as of November 18, 2026, 9:12 PM IST. nginx2root is an evolving situation, and we will update this page as more information comes in.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Sources:<\/strong> <a href=\"https:\/\/nginx2root.com\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">nginx2root.com<\/a>; nginx2root research writeup (xint.io\/blog\/nginx2root-remote-code-execution), published November 18, 2026. Research credit: @imssm99, @cdor1, @tjbecker, and @yves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>TLDR; nginx2root is the name given to five independent nginx vulnerabilities and one Linux kernel flaw, published on November 18, 2026. nginx is a widely deployed web server and reverse proxy. Each of the five nginx flaws lets an unauthenticated remote attacker run commands with the privileges of an nginx worker process, in different configurations: &#8230; <a title=\"nginx2root: Five nginx RCE Flaws and a Kernel Bug (CVE-2026-123007)\" class=\"read-more\" href=\"https:\/\/www.getastra.com\/blog\/security-advisory\/nginx2root\/\" aria-label=\"Read more about nginx2root: Five nginx RCE Flaws and a Kernel Bug (CVE-2026-123007)\">Read more<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":138,"featured_media":50345,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[819],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-50343","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-security-advisory"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.getastra.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/50343","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.getastra.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.getastra.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.getastra.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/138"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.getastra.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=50343"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/www.getastra.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/50343\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":50352,"href":"https:\/\/www.getastra.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/50343\/revisions\/50352"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.getastra.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/50345"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.getastra.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=50343"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.getastra.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=50343"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.getastra.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=50343"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}